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Abstract 
The development of Internet brought in revolutions in pricing models in the music industry. 
Currently, there are two common schemes to sell digital music. The first one is referred to as 
the ownership model, under which the consumers purchase and download the singles they 
prefer. The second one is referred to as the subscription model, under which consumers 
subscribe to the streaming services by paying a subscription fee. Out paper reveals that the 
advertisement revenue rate impacts music service providers’ choice of pricing models. The 
music provider should choose the subscription model, when the advertisement revenue rate is 
low; the ownership model when the advertisement revenue rate is moderate; and offer the music 
for free and exploit profit from advertisements when the advertisement revenue rate is high. 
Keywords: music pricing models, subscription, ad-sponsored 
 
 
  
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The traditional way of consuming music is to purchase an album as a bundle of several singles. 
The development of digital technologies enables consumers to purchase only the singles they 
prefer. iTunes Music Store firstly introduces the musing pricing scheme based on singles. Since 
then, the market of digital music has been developing rapidly. For example, sales of digital 
music increased 6.9 percent in 20141.  
There are two common ways of consuming digital music: to purchase and download a single 
or to subscribe to a streaming service. We refer to purchasing and downloading singles as the 
ownership pricing model and subscribing to the streaming service as the subscription pricing 
model through this paper. Under the subscription model consumers have access to unlimited 
music by paying a subscription fee on a recurring basis. Subscription model is usually 
implemented as a premium business model. Examples include Pandora, Spotify, Tidal, Rdio 
and Dezzer. In this pricing model, consumers can either to choose to subscribe to enjoy ad-free 
music or to enjoy music for free which comes with advertisings (usually also come with low 
quality). 
Under the ownership model, the consumers purchase and download singles and consume the 
purchased singles without time limit. Examples include Bandcamp NETEASE, TENCENT and 
XIAMI. Similar to the subscription model, the music service providers under the ownership 
model usually also provide ad-supported free service to consumers.  
Currently, downloading remain the biggest source of digital revenues, accounting for 52 percent 
of the digital market in 2014. However, the revenue from downloading declined by 8.0 percent 
while the revenue from subscription increased by 39 percent in 20142.  
It seems both pricing models split the market share but the subscription model is cannibalizing 
the market share of ownership model. But is the subscription model is the dominating model in 
the future? And importantly, which pricing model should be adopted from the music service 
providers’ perspectives?  
This paper aims to provide insights to the above questions. Specifically, this paper addresses 
the following research questions: what is the optimal pricing strategies under different models? 
What is the optimal pricing strategy and under what conditions? 
The analysis shows that the advertisement revenue rate, referring to the revenue generated by 
advertisements from one consumer, is a significant factor that impacts the music provider’s 
choice of pricing models. When the advertisement revenue rate is low, the music provider 
should choose the subscription model; when the advertisement revenue rate is moderate, the 
music provider should choose the ownership model; when the advertisement revenue rate is 
high, either pricing models should be adopted and the music provider will instead offer the 
music for free and harvests profit from advertisements. 
This paper relates most to the research on ad-sponsored business models. Riggins (2002) has 
discussed a separating equilibrium of how to balance the content quality and price based on the 
                                                             
1 See http://ifpi.org/news/IFPI-publishes-Recording-Industry-in-Numbers-2015  
2 See http://ifpi.org/news/IFPI-publishes-Recording-Industry-in-Numbers-2015. 
 
 
free ad-sponsored model, two types consumers are involved. In our study, the content quality 
is an exogenous variable, and we use inconvenience sensitivity to differentiate consumers 
instead of only two types of consumers. Prasad et al. (2003) and Gabszewicz et al. (2006) have 
explored how to balance subscription price and the amount of advertising and they find that 
advertising lowers the prices. Different from these studies, we endogenize the amount of 
advertisements and the price level to get optimal profits. Besides subscription model, our 
research also include analysis on ownership model. There are also much research about the 
relationship between the content and advertising in the ad-sponsored business model (e.g., 
Steiner 1952; Beebe 1977; Spence and Owen 1977; Doyle 1998; Gal-Or and Dukes 2003; 
Bourreau 2003; Gabszewicz et al. 2006; Peitz and Valletti 2008). In our study, however, we 
focus on the relationship of the level of advertising and the price of the content under the ad-
sponsored model. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model description and model setup. 
Section 3 analyzes and compare the subscription model and ownership model. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
2 MODEL 
We will derive the music provider’s profit functions under each pricing models in this section.  
The notation used in this paper is summarized in Table 1.  
 
K  Maximal utility consumer can get from music provider 
u  Consumer’s utility on music  
  the proportion of maximal utility in free version 
  Advertisement revenue rate 
  Cost sensitivity  
Fc  Usage cost of accessing music in the free version 
Sc  Usage cost of accessing music in the subscription 
Oc  Usage cost of accessing music in the ownership 
  Extent of the influence on free music, if consumer chooses the ownership pricing 
q  Songs one consumer purchases when K equals infinity under ownership model 
a  Advertising level  
p  Price for one song 
T    Fixed subscription fee 
Table 1. List of Notation 
Let K  denote the maximal utility that consumers obtain from adopting the paid music 
services (including the subscription model and ownership model). K  is used to capture the 
 
 
fact that one person is only able to allocate limited amount of time to consume music each day 
and thus can only obtain limited utility at most. When the consumers adopt the free service 
model, however, the maximal utility consumers can obtain is given by K , where 0 1  . 
  is used to capture features including the reduced music quality and limited access to new 
songs of the free service. For example, the free music service provided by Pandora and Spotify 
come with lower quality compared to the paid services. Netease's Cloud Music provides limited 
access to new singles under the free music service.  
When choosing to enjoy the music for free, the consumers don’t need to pay for the music but 
need to tolerate the advertisements. Let a  denote the intensity of the advertisement. The 
higher a  is, the lower consumers’ utilities are.  
Further, there are usage costs incurred to consumers when they choose the free service model. 
Consumers have to tolerate some inconveniences under the free service. For example, Google 
Play Music, Xbox Music, Spotify and Pandora provide free services with limited skips. That is, 
consumers can skip songs for limited times per hour. In addition, Spotify disables offline 
listening for the free music service. Thus, we let Fc  denote the aggregate usage cost under the 
free service model.  
Consumers are heterogeneous in the sensitivity to the usage cost. The cost sensitivity is 
designated by  , which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,inf].  
Similar to the model set up in Fan (2007), the utility consumers derive from consuming music 
under the free service model is given by  
F Fu K a c    .                         (1) 
We then explore consumers’ utility function under the subscription model.  
Let T  denote the subscription fee. Under the subscription, there also exists usage cost incurred 
to consumers that might come from two sources. The first is that under some music providers 
(e.g. Spotify) there exists search cost for singles the consumers prefer. The second is that some 
music providers (e.g. Pandora) offer streamed music like a radio station with pre-selected lists 
of songs (although consumers can skip songs they dislike). This may also lead to a usage cost 
incurred to consumers. Thus, we let Sc  denote the aggregate usage cost under the subscription 
model.  
Thus, the utility consumers obtain from consuming music under the subscription model is given 
by  
S Su K T c   ,                          (2) 
Last, we derive the consumers’ utility function when they choose the ownership model. Note 
that consumers are still able to consume music provided by the free service besides the 
purchased singles. Thus, consumers’ utility function under the ownership model consists of two 
parts as follows.  
 
 
( ) ( (1 )) (1 )K KO F Ou K a c u q e pq e c   
         ,              (3) 
Under the ownership model, there are usage costs incurred to consumers as well. These costs 
may include the time and efforts spent on making online payments for singles and managing 
purchased singles locally. We use Oc  to denote the aggregate usage cost under the ownership 
model. ( (1 )) (1 )K K Ou q e pq e c
      is the consumers’ utility obtained from the singles 
they purchased. For simplicity and tractability, we let (1 )Kq e  denotes the number of 
singles each consumer will purchase, which is positively correlated with the maximal utility 
consumers obtain from music provider K . The number of singles consumers will purchase 
equals 0 when 0K   and equals q  when =K  . The number of singles consumers 
purchase cannot be infinity since consumers can only spend certain amount of time on 
consuming music. The utility consumers obtained by consuming music should be non-
decreasing and concave in the number of singles they consumed. Thus, ( (1 ))Ku q e  has the 
following characteristics: (0) 0u  ; 0
( (1 ))K
u
q e


 
; 
2
2
0
( (1 ))K
u
q e


 
 for all 
(1 )Kq e .  
On the other hand, consumers can still access to the free music service under the ownership 
model. Usually, consumers will purchase limited amount of singles and thus will spend some 
time to enjoy unpurchased singles through the free service. ( )FK a c     refers to 
consumers’ utility obtained from using the free service under the ownership model. By Eq. (1), 
FK a c    is the consumers’ utility obtained by only using the free service. (0 1)    
is a discount factor here to capture the fact that consumers will only allocate one portion of time 
to consuming music through the free service under the ownership model.  
We then derive the music provider’s profit functions under the two pricing models.  
We first explore the subscription model. Under this model, consumers can choose either to 
subscribe ads-clean service or enjoy the music for free which comes with advertisements.  
The market segmentation is given by Fig. 1 as follows.  
 
Figure 1. Market Segmentation in the Subscription Model 
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Let S  denotes the marginal consumer type who is indifferent between the subscription model 
and the free model. Solving the equation F Su u , we can obtain that 
(1 )
( )S F S
F S
T a K
u u
c c

 
  
  

. The number of consumers choose to adopt the free service 
(1 )S
F
F S
T a K
D
c c
  


. 
Consumers with a   greater than S  will choose to subscribe. S  is obtained by letting 
0Su  . Thus, we obtain that S
S
K T
c


 . The number of consumers will choose to subscribe 
thus is
(1 )
= SSS F
S F S
K T T a K
D D
c c c


   
  

. 
Thus, we can write down the music provider’s profit function under the subscription model as 
follows.  
(1 ) (1 )
( )SS F S
F S S F S
T a K K T T a K
D a D T a T
c c c c c
 
  
      
    
 
,     (4) 
where 
(1 )
F S
T a K
a
c c


  

 is the profit from advertisement in the free version,   is the 
advertisement revenue rate, and 
(1 )
( )
S F S
K T T a K
T
c c c
   


 is the profit from the 
subscription fee. 
To guarantee non-negative demand, the conditions 0S FD   and 0SD   must be satisfied, 
which leads to (1 )T a K    and 
( ) S
F
K a c
T K
c
 
  . 
Similarly, consumers can choose to purchase favorite singles or only use the free service. Note 
that consumers can still use the free service after purchased singles. The market segmentation 
is given by Fig. 2 as shown below.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Market Segmentation in the Ownership Model 
The marginal consumer type who is indifferent between to purchase singles and only use the 
free service is denote by O . Solving the equation F Ou u , we can obtain that 
(1 )
O
F S
T a K
c c


  


. 
Consumers with a   smaller than O  will choose to only use the free service. Thus, the 
number of consumers who choose only to use the free service is given by 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
K
O
F O
F O
K a pq e u
D
c c
  


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 
 
. 
Consumers with a   greater than O will choose to purchase singles. O  is obtained by 
letting 0Ou  . Therefore, we get that 
( ) (1 )K
O
F O
K a u pq e
c c
 


   


. The number of 
consumers who choose to purchase singles is given by 
( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
K K
OO O
F O F O
K a u pq e K a pq e u
D
c c c c
    
 
 
          
   
  
. 
Thus, the music provider's profit function is given by  
( ) (1 )KO F O OD D a pq e D  
    ,                     (5) 
where ( )F OD D a   is the revenue from the advertisements,   is the advertisement 
revenue rate and OpqD  is the revenue from the sales of singles.  
To guarantee non-negative demand, 0FD   and 0OD   must be satisfied, which requires 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )K
u a K
p
q e
  

   


 and 
( )
(1 )
F O
K
F
uc K a c
p
c q e


 


. 
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3 THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SUBSCRIPTION 
MODEL AND OWNERSHIP MODEL 
3.1 The Optimal Design of the Subscription Model 
In order to achieve the optimal profit under the subscription model, the music provider needs 
to solve the following decision problem. 
,
(1 ) (1 )
max ( )
a T
F S S F S
T a K K T T a K
a T
c c c c c
 

      
 
 
         (6) 
s.t. 
( )
(1 ) ,0S
F
K a c
a K T K a K
c

 

        
Proposition 1. When the music provider adopts the subscription model, there are three possible 
market outcomes: 
(i) When 
1
2 1




, the optimal subscription fee is *
2
K
T  , the optimal advertisement 
intensity is *
2
2
K K
a
 
 , and the optimal profit the music provider will achieve is 
2
*
4
S
S
K
c
  . Further, all consumers choose to subscribe to the music service rather than 
adopting the free service in this case. 
(ii) When 
21
1
2 1
F
S
c
c

 
  

, 
*
2
( 2 (1 ) )
4 (1 )
F S
F S
K c c
T
c c
   
 
    

  
,
*
2
(( 1 2 ) (1 ) )
4 (1 )
F S
F S
K c c
a
c c
   
 
    

  
, and 
2
*
2
( (1 ) )
( 4 (1 ) )
F S
S
S F S
K c c
c c c
   

 
   

  
. In this case, 
there exist both consumers who subscribe to the music service and consumers who adopt the 
free service. 
(iii) When 
2
1F
S
c
c


  , *
2
2
F S
F
Kc K c
T
c

 , *
2
K
a

 , and 
2 2
*
4
S
F
K
c
 
  . In this case, all 
consumers adopt the free service and no consumer choose to subscribe. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is illustrated as follows. When the advertisement revenue 
rate   is low, the music provider won’t receive much profit from the free music service (which 
makes profit by sending out advertisements). Thus, when   is lower than a threshold value 
(corresponding to case 1 in Prop. 1), the best strategy for the music provider is to set *T  and 
 
 
*a  such than all consumers will choose to subscribe. When the advertisement revenue rate   
is moderate (corresponding to case 2 in Prop. 1), the music provider set *T  and *a  to harvest 
profit both from the free version and the subscription version. When the advertisement revenue 
rate   is high enough (corresponding to case 3 in Prop. 1), the free music model is more 
efficient than the subscription model in terms of generating profit. Thus, the best strategy for 
the music provider is to set *T  and *a  such than all consumers will choose to adopt the free 
service.  
3.2 The Optimal Design of the Ownership Model 
Under the ownership model, the music provider needs to solve the following decision problem 
to achieve the optimal profit.  
 ,
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
max  ( ))
(1 ) (1 )
( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
(1 )
(1 ) (1
s.t.    
K K K
a p
F O F O F O
K K
F O F O
K a pq e u K a u pq e K a pq e u
a
c c c c c c
K a u pq e K a pq e u
pq
c c c c
u a
       
 
  
    
 

  
 
               
 
    
         
 
  
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(
( ))
,0
(1 ) (1 )
F O
K K
F
uc K a cK
p a K
q e c q e
 

 
 
   
 
(7) 
Proposition 2. Under the ownership model, the music provider sets the single price and 
advertising level as follows. 
(i) If 
22 2 2 2 3
0
2
F F F O O O
O
u c K c K c uc K c K c w
K c
    


     
  ， where  
2 2 24 (2 2 2 2 3 )O F F F O O Ow Ku c u c K c K c uc K c K c            , then the optimal 
advertisement intensity is *
(2 ( 2 )
2 2( 1 )
u K
a
  
 
    

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, the price for one song is 
* ( 1 ) (1 ( 1 2 ) )
2 (1 )(1 ( 1 ) )K
K u
p
q e
    
 
     

   
, and the optimal profit the music provider will achieve 
is 
2
* ( )
4(1 ( 1 ) )( )
O
F O
u K
c c


  


   
. In this case, all consumers choose to pay for the music. 
(ii) If 
22 2 2 2 3 2
1
2
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u c K c K c uc K c K c w uc
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 
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2 2 24 (2 2 2 2 3 )O F F F O O Ow Ku c u c K c K c uc K c K c            , then the optimal 
advertising level is given by 
2 2
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2 2 2
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, the optimal single price is 
given by 
 
 
2 2
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2 2 2
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
       
, the 
optimal profit equals 
2 2 2
*
2 2 2
( ( ( 1 ) ) ( (1 ) ( 1 2 )) )
4 ( 1 ) 4 ( 1 2 ) (1 )
F O
F F O O
u K c K u K c
c c c c
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
     
        

      
. In 
this case, some consumers choose to pay for the music, some choose the free service. 
(iii) If 
2
1F
O
uc
K c


  , then the optimal level
* * *( , , )Op a  are given by 
*
2
K
a

 , 
* 2
2 (1 )
F O
K
F
uc K c
p
q e c





, 
2 2
*
4
O
F
K
c
 
  . In this case, all consumers choose the free service. 
Similar to the situation of the subscription model, when the advertisement revenue rate   is 
low, the music provider won’t receive much profit from the free music service (which makes 
profit by sending out advertisements). Thus, when   is lower than a threshold value 
(corresponding to case 1 in Prop. 1), the best strategy for the music provider is to set 
*p  and 
*a  such than all consumers will choose to pay for the songs. When the advertisement revenue 
rate   is moderate (corresponding to case 2 in Prop. 1), the music provider set *p  and *a  
to harvest profit both from the free version and the paid music. When the advertisement revenue 
rate   is high enough (corresponding to case 3 in Prop. 1), the free music model is more 
efficient than the ownership model in terms of generating profit. Thus, the best strategy for the 
music provider is to set 
*p  and *a  such than all consumers will choose to adopt the free 
service.  
3.3 Comparison between the Subscription and Ownership Models 
In this section, we compare the optimal profits achieved under each model and explore the 
conditions under which each model performs better. We resort to computational analysis since 
the comparison of the formula is difficult.  
Setting =2K , =0.8  (the maximal utility obtained by using the free service is 80% of the 
paid service), =1.5u , =0.4Fc , =0.2Sc , =0.12Oc , we obtain Fig. 3 as follows.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Subscription model and Ownership model 
When   is relatively low in the first period, the music provider’s profit primarily comes from 
charging consumers, which is similar to the pure pricing without advertising. According to the 
prior literature, the bundling strategy is dominant to pure unbundling. So the music provider 
should choose the subscription strategy---one kind of bundling strategies (Varian 1995). 
When   is moderate in the second period, the profits come from both advertising and 
payments. The ownership model is more flexible, people who choose ownership can also use 
the free version. But in the subscription model, if consumer choose subscription, there is no 
advertising. So, in the second period, the music provider should choose ownership model. 
When   is high in the last period, the music provider’s profit depends on advertising revenue. 
So the music provider will push consumers be on the free version by increasing the subscription 
free or other methods. Then the profit functions of subscription and ownership are coincident. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Music industry is undergoing dramatic changes. The rapid development of the Internet first 
brought in the way of purchasing singles by downloading, namely the ownership model and 
then streaming service based on subscription. Thus, it is a crucial question facing the music 
service providers that whether to adopt the subscription model or the ownership model.  
This paper provides guidelines on which pricing models to choose. We find that the 
advertisement revenue rate is an important factor which impacts music service providers’ 
choice of pricing models. When the advertisement revenue rate is low, the music provider 
should choose the subscription model. When the advertisement revenue rate is moderate, the 
music provider should choose the ownership model. And lastly when the advertisement revenue 
rate is relatively high, both pricing strategies should not be adopted and the music provider will 
instead offer the music for free and harvests profit from advertisements.  
In the future, we will conduct more analysis on the effects of other parameters. For example, 
the maximal utility consumers can get from music provider K  and the proportion of maximal 
utility in free version  , might also affect music providers’ choice of pricing strategies. 
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